Revamping Manchester…

Do you recall when Manchester United’s latest star signing made this statement?

“We have to unify. Now isn’t the time to point fingers or assign blame,” he stated. “We must stand together—with the manager, his staff, and the board of the club.”

“We must keep moving forward, support the manager, and believe in him. As players, we understand the need for improvement. The responsibility doesn’t lie solely with him—it’s a collective effort. Blaming one individual is not the answer—we are all in this together.”

No, I’m not referring to Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbeumo, or Benjamin Sesko. Not even Cristiano Ronaldo or Bruno Fernandes, or any of the many names that come to mind.

I’m talking about Juan Mata, who had been sidelined by José Mourinho at Chelsea before transferring to Manchester United for €44.73 million in January 2014. Those quotes are dated back to April of that very same year.

“During my time at Chelsea, when I wasn’t playing, everyone said, ‘Maybe Manchester United isn’t at its best this season, but it’s still Manchester United!’ It’s not like joining a club that’s just had one season in the Champions League. This club is built to be at the top. Even if we miss Champions League one year, we will be back, or we will still win trophies, because that’s what Manchester United is about.”

Weeks later, David Moyes was dismissed before completing his first season at United, the first after Sir Alex Ferguson. Fast forward over ten years, and Mata’s words could easily be echoed by nearly any player at the club since then: the manager is blamed for the team’s failures, players signed by the manager come to his defense, and the club’s storied history is invoked to inspire hope for a brighter future—all while the inability to uphold that history leads to the next manager’s dismissal.

This pattern is practically ritualistic. It started with Moyes, followed by Louis van Gaal, José Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjær, and Erik ten Hag. Historical trends suggest that the same fate awaits Ruben Amorim at some point.

At this point, it becomes futile to analyze United’s performances or watch the matches—the cycle of stagnation has been ongoing for a decade. Despite the underlying performance data suggesting potential—like having the fourth-best expected goal differential in the league—I refuse to become convinced, and neither should you.

Unless there is substantial change, we will continue writing the same critiques, engaging in the same debates, and hearing the same rhetoric from various players and managers until the end of time. A significant part of this stagnation is due to the fact that no one at Manchester United truly wants things to change. Since acquiring the club, the Glazer family has overseen a remarkable decline in on-field success while the valuation of the club skyrocketed into the billions.

However, what if the key decision-makers at United genuinely wanted to build a competitive soccer team again—a squad capable of contending with Liverpool, Arsenal, and Manchester City at the top of the Premier League? How should they approach this?

It’s quite straightforward: simply replicate what those clubs are doing.

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Step One: Adopt Liverpool’s Decision-Making

When Fenway Sports Group (FSG) acquired Liverpool, they were recovering from a seventh-place finish, subsequently slumping to more sixth, eighth, and seventh place finishes. After nearly winning the league in 2013-14, Liverpool reverted back to sixth and eighth in the following seasons. They were trapped in a cycle of mediocrity with fleeting moments of hope, which parallels United’s current state. Yet, Liverpool has secured top-four finishes in eight out of the last nine seasons, winning the Premier League twice, claiming the European Cup once, and making it to two additional Champions League finals. The team is now in a position that prompts speculation about whether they are indeed in crisis, despite sitting in second place in the league, just one point off the top.

So, how did Liverpool pull themselves up?

For the 2010-11 season, the club’s revenue ranked ninth in world soccer—significantly disproportionate to their league performance. They were more comparable financially to well-established clubs like Schalke in Germany, being the third-richest team in Italy or Spain. Manchester United, meanwhile, occupied a different financial tier entirely, outpacing Liverpool and Chelsea, while Arsenal also remained ahead.

For Liverpool to compete with these financial powerhouses, they needed to maximize their spending efficiency, and they achieved this by leveraging data analytics. More crucially, Liverpool established a decision-making framework that ensured that data informed how the club operated.

“The owners were deeply engaged in a data-driven approach, which is not always the case elsewhere,” relayed Ian Graham, Liverpool’s former head of research. “From my experience, you need that top-down support, or else it won’t translate into success.”

Graham had the fortune of working alongside a sporting director, Michael Edwards, who shared a strong belief in leveraging data. Edwards understood that data could shed light on insights beyond plain observation and streamline the workload for the coaching staff. With Graham’s team providing actionable insights, decisions were collaboratively made by Edwards, then-manager Jürgen Klopp, and FSG’s representative, Mike Gordon, ensuring that signings met criteria for scouting, coaching compatibility, and financial sensibility.

While Liverpool couldn’t match the spending capabilities of Manchester United or Real Madrid, their process allowed them to identify undervalued players and successfully outbid others for their signatures. This strategy was behind the signings of players like Roberto Firmino, Sadio Mané, and Mohamed Salah, long before they clinched significant trophies.

United has never established a similar decision-making apparatus. Post-Ferguson, the manager held all power, and once he departed in 2013, the Glazers showed no inclination to modernize the club’s operations. Since then, a power vacuum has been erratically filled season after season.

Meanwhile, many big clubs have identified a shift toward transforming decision-making structures away from the manager and adopting smarter investment protocols for player acquisitions, highlighting the primary reason for United’s lack of success despite their simultaneous spending.

If we draw comparisons to other sports, United could find inspiration in the Los Angeles Dodgers. They’ve not only invested more than anyone else in baseball but also brought in Andrew Friedman, who previously restructured the Tampa Bay Rays into a playoff contender by embracing innovative, data-driven strategies. Marrying first-rate analytical decision-making with substantial financial resources has led to consistent playoff appearances for the Dodgers.

While I’m uncertain who would fill the role of Andrew Friedman, this position should be the utmost priority for Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS. Managers and players come and go, but the club needs stability from someone invested in the long-term development over a multi-year roadmap.

It’s only been a year, but Ratcliffe and his affiliates have already dropped the ball. They’ve compounded mistakes spectacularly.

Initially, they brought in Dan Ashworth from Newcastle United for the position, but he departed from the club due to disagreements about Amorim’s hiring. Since then, Ratcliffe’s deputy, Sir Dave Brailsford, momentarily took on the director of football role before being succeeded by Jason Wilcox, who previously held minor roles at Southampton and United.

The issue goes beyond the individual’s identity—if your leading football decision-maker leaves due to conflicts over coaching appointments, there’s a significant breakdown in your decision-making framework.

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Step Two: Build an Academy Like Arsenal’s

A major factor in Arsenal’s current position at the Premier League summit is their deep-seated commitment to nurturing young talent—this manifests in two significant ways.

Firstly, Arsenal’s academy is on an exceptional trajectory. Bukayo Saka has emerged as one of the world’s finest players, valued significantly in the transfer market. Interestingly, how much did Arsenal initially pay for Saka? Nothing.

The consultancy Twenty First Group estimated that Liverpool saved £150 million over nine seasons thanks to the contributions of Trent Alexander-Arnold, which indicates the potential savings from developing homegrown talent effectively.

With Saka contributing immense value, it’s plausible that in a few years, almost 40% of Arsenal’s starting lineup could be made up of academy graduates, with emerging talents like Myles Lewis-Skelly, Ethan Nwaneri, and Max Dowman still in their teenage years but ready to impact the first team.

This is fundamental to building a successful team. The rise of players such as Alexander-Arnold and Saka is a pivotal reason why both clubs have risen toward the pinnacle of world football. Even a squad like Manchester City, which splashes considerable money, has benefitted from the emergence of Phil Foden.

While several academy players helped Chelsea clinch the Champions League, Manchester United’s brightest academy prospect in recent years, Alejandro Garnacho, now plays for Chelsea. Their preceding best academy product, Marcus Rashford, is currently on loan at Barcelona. While player development is unpredictable, a strategic investment in the academy pays dividends over time.

Even without the geographical benefits that Arsenal enjoys being in London, if Liverpool can do it, then Manchester United definitely can establish an academy that produces top-level talent, particularly considering their current form doesn’t measure up to Liverpool or Arsenal.

Beyond cultivating talent, Arsenal also focused on acquiring young players during their rebuilding phase. Most of Arsenal’s core players last season were signed before or just as they entered their prime years. For example:

• Ricardo Calafiori: 22
• Gabriel Magalhães: 22
• William Saliba: 18
• Ben White: 23
• Declan Rice: 24
• Mikel Merino: 28
• Martin Ødegaard: 22
• Gabriel Martinelli: 18
• Kai Havertz: 24
• Bukayo Saka: 7

Jurriën Timber, starting at right back, was signed at 22, while Lewis-Skelly and Nwaneri, both academy products, began a sufficient number of matches. Acquisitions like Jakub Kiwior, brought in at 21, also helped strengthen the squad.

Among all league players making over ten starts last season, only Merino, Leandro Trossard, and Thomas Partey joined when already established in their primes—a trajectory that speaks to Arsenal’s strategy of targeting younger talents with developmental potential.

Arsenal’s rejuvenation into a title contender stems from successful investments in youthful talent. They’ve recently turned to older players only when they were close to competing for the title. This approach does come with its risks, yet it has proven effective for clubs like Arsenal.

In contrast, United signed 25-year-old Mbeumo and 26-year-old Cunha this past summer, right after ending up in 15th place in the league. They also brought in 30-year-old Casemiro with a hefty contract after finishing a season where they scored as many goals as they conceded. Remember when Sofyan Amrabat was associated with the team? What about Mount—is he set to boost United’s long-term potential?

While several of United’s recent younger signings have struggled, like Rasmus Højlund currently on loan or Antony now with Real Betis, the lack of direction in the player identification process is apparent without a unified framework to assess the value of potential signings.

Player development can be unpredictable, but a structured decision-making process prevents a club from losing confidence due to a few missteps; they know that even the best clubs only succeed with slightly more than half of their acquisitions.

Ultimately, the crux of these failures comes back to the manager and their impact on Manchester United.

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Step Three: Train Like Manchester City

As discussed earlier, Moyes brought Marouane Fellaini from Everton, Van Gaal signed Bastian Schweinsteiger from Bayern Munich, Mourinho secured Nemanja Matic from Chelsea, Solskjær rejoined Cristiano Ronaldo, and Erik ten Hag imported four of his Ajax players along with other former acquaintances.

Whereas Amorim’s signings have been less predictably narrow-minded than Ten Hag’s, they still reflect the singularity of his preferred tactical approaches.

Do you see the dilemma?

None of those managers held their positions for three whole seasons, yet the players they signed typically had contracts extending beyond that timeframe. Consequently, United’s roster ended up resembling a disorganized amalgamation of different managers’ preferences—leading to ill-suited structures.

What they need to do is abandon the notion of finding a singular, all-powerful coach. They should instead aspire for flexibility, mirroring the adaptability seen in Pep Guardiola’s teams.

In Guardiola’s inaugural title-winning season at City, he transformed Fabian Delph into a full-back. While Delph had not showcased remarkable capabilities before or after that season, Guardiola maximized his utility.

The next season, he adapted his approach around Sergio Agüero—one of the league’s all-time great forwards, despite having initially favored more versatile, fluid attacking options. He found a way to leverage Agüero’s talents effectively, even with Kevin De Bruyne sidelined for much of the campaign.

How did he accomplish this? By taking a more traditional route. Amidst the trend of inverted wingers, Guardiola utilized Leroy Sané on the left and the right-footed Raheem Sterling on the right. Though they didn’t tally as many points, their tactical execution arguably was superior.

After transitioning away from Agüero, Guardiola led City to title victories with innovative tactics that didn’t rely on a typical center forward setup. They scored 99 goals in 2021-22, with no player finishing in the top five for the league; instead, seven players each netted a minimum of eight times.

Erling Haaland then broke the Premier League scoring record during his first season, showcasing a different stylistic approach, leading City to further success. They now feature a more conservative style compared to Guardiola’s earlier teams.

United needs to seek managerial candidates not in search of their next “Pep,” but rather those with adaptiveness. This means hiring coaches who excel at leveraging available talent in effective arrangements.

A source involved in data-driven management across various sports noted that flexibility and problem-solving skills are paramount qualities sought in a coach. Hiring such a coach can vastly widen the talent pool available for signing—this prevents the club from being molded into a mismatched roster that caters to varied managerial styles.

Setting forth a coherent overall playing philosophy is still essential. For a club with United’s ambitions, they can’t imitate the style of Burnley’s or even Scott Parker’s teams. They must establish dominance on critical playing areas, both offensively and defensively.

Nevertheless, both Klopp’s Liverpool and Guardiola’s Manchester City embraced attacking soccer while reflecting vastly different styles. Even highly contrasting managers can dominate possession and yield positive outcomes.

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Step Four: If Not, Sell the Club

While this may sound straightforward, it’s equally simple—Manchester United possesses immense financial capabilities that would allow them to thrive through average decision-making across all areas: strategic planning, understanding player age curves, and coach identification. Achieving mediocrity in these aspects should still yield contention for titles season after season.

However, ease and simplicity are not synonymous, and it’s clear there exists an underlying cultural and operational decay within the club.

The convoluted decision-making framework stifles progress. Financial success diminishes the imperative for sweeping reform. The lingering echoes of the Ferguson Era poorly influence the club’s current trajectory. Moreover, a substantial portion of British soccer media consists of former United players whose insights may be questionable at best. If surmounting these challenges were easy, the team wouldn’t be facing such difficulties.

At the heart of it all lies ownership. Outside of the fans, it’s the owners that have been the perpetual constant.

The Glazers have proven to be detrimental owners of Manchester United in football terms, though remarkably successful business owners. While I’m skeptical about their hybrid ownership model—in which they maintain ownership while allowing Ratcliffe to manage the club—they purportedly distanced themselves from the hands-on decision-making they never truly engaged with.

If Ratcliffe does indeed possess full control, he should implement all the strategies discussed. He wouldn’t have to answer to anyone; as a billionaire, he holds sway.

Rebuilding the organization will require time, but if Ratcliffe is committed, United can truly revamp their decision-making frameworks, invest in new methods for objectively assessing players, focus on constructing a title-challenging squad over a five-year outlook rather than a win-now approach, and abandon the pursuit of a single magical coach.

Unfortunately, Ratcliffe appears more preoccupied with trivial issues like preventing employees from “working from home” or ensuring that cafeteria workers don’t overconsume.

Alternatively, United could persist in their current approach. They could endlessly spiral in mediocrity, lacking a cohesive strategy binding their operations. They may continue to reset the cycle of managerial dismissals due to mounting losses stemming from this fragmented decision-making.

But should it be worth $1.65 billion for Ratcliffe to allow this to continue—regardless of his lifelong allegiance to the club? There must be another billionaire out there willing to come in, empower the right people, and instigate meaningful change within Manchester United, right?