On Monday, after suffering a 1-0 loss to Lazio over the weekend, Juventus parted ways with manager Igor Tudor. Currently, there is no immediate successor in sight, but names such as former Italy coach Luciano Spalletti and Raffaele Palladino, who guided Fiorentina to a sixth-place finish last season, are under consideration. Whoever steps in will be the sixth permanent manager in the last six years.
Juventus serves as an example of mismanagement within a club, illustrating how past mistakes continue to impact the present and future, limiting the options for their potential replacements. The choice they make next could either exacerbate their downward trend or finally start to cleanse the club of its accumulated dysfunction.
Tudor’s dismissal signifies not just accountability for his individual shortcomings, but also for the missteps made by his predecessors, spanning coaches, sporting directors, and executives, with various players bearing responsibility as well.
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Tudor had taken the interim role in March of last year, succeeding Thiago Motta. The club’s goal during that time was to secure a top-four finish in Serie A, a target he achieved by securing the final Champions League spot by a single point.
The club intended to devise a long-term strategy for the 2025-26 season, but critical decision-making responsibilities were in flux; Cristiano Giuntoli, the key figure in player recruitment, was already on his way out less than two years into a five-year contract. His successor, Damien Comolli, took office on June 1. With the Club World Cup approaching, he decided to keep Tudor for the upcoming season.
The rationale behind retaining Tudor seemed to rest on the limited timeframe—just five or six weeks—to identify a suitable long-term coach before the 2025-26 season commenced. They avoided a hasty decision, but with the benefit of hindsight, that choice proved misguided; as October approaches, they find themselves with just days to appoint a new manager.
Comolli and his team began working on summer transfers, albeit with constraints. Juventus recorded a spending of €137 million ($160 million), a substantial figure, but over €105.8 million ($123 million) was consumed in making previous loan deals permanent for players like Chico Conceicao, Pierre Kalulu, Lloyd Kelly, Nico González (who was subsequently loaned out to Atletico Madrid), and Michele Di Gregorio. Since many of these deals were obligatory, Comolli had limited flexibility in shaping the summer roster, illustrating how past decisions have constrained the present.
Despite this, the club subsequently made four signings, raising questions about how closely they considered Tudor’s tactical preferences.
Wingers Eden Zhegrova and João Mário contributed just two league starts collectively. The other two additions were forwards: free agent Jonathan David, who signed a lucrative contract making him the club’s second-highest paid player, and Loïs Openda. Their combined contribution amounted to six league starts and a single goal. Given Tudor’s preference for a 3-4-2-1 formation—which typically deploys only one center forward—limited the playing time available with Dusan Vlahovic still in the ranks, it’s an inefficient use of resources, considering that these three strikers constitute roughly 20% of Juve’s wage bill.
Moreover, Tudor’s system necessitates three central defenders, yet the squad comprises only five, the bare minimum for competing at the Champions League level. Despite having three times as many defenders on the pitch compared to forwards, they account for less than 12% of the wage expenses. Thus, this points to another failure in resource management.
You can imagine Comolli saying: “What am I supposed to do? The club has recorded over half a billion Euros in losses over the last five years. My predecessors made commitments I now have to navigate.”
He would be correct to some extent. The impacts of COVID-19 paired with short-term strategies resulted in accounting maneuvers and “buy now, pay later” arrangements that significantly constrain the club now. The continued presence of players like Filip Kostic, Daniele Rugani, and Arek Milik (who hasn’t played since June 2024) echoes this narrative. (Interestingly, Arthur remains a Juventus player as well, although on loan elsewhere, preventing constant reminders of earlier mistakes.)
Compounding the issue are the missed opportunities with homegrown talent—players like Matìas Soulè, Dean Huijsen, Koni De Winter, Moise Kean, and Nicolo’ Fagioli were allowed to leave for a total of less than €85 million; their current market values have increased two-and-a-half times. It seems Juventus invested heavily in their B-team—Juve Next Gen, competing in the third tier—not for development, but rather as a financial asset to resolve accounting issues elsewhere.
While discussions on stability and long-term squad-building are valid, we must first acknowledge that, akin to pollution, it is often future generations that bear the burdens of past mistakes. Juventus’ recent history is littered with errors, leaving those in the current leadership roles significantly constrained.
This background makes Juventus’ future actions particularly intriguing. They do possess a solid core of young talent under long-term contracts, including Kenan Yildiz (20), David (25), Khephren Thuram (24), Conceicao (22), Andrea Cambiaso (25), and Kalulu (25). If they can retain Vlahovic at a manageable cost, the potential exists for a brighter future. However, it will require time to eliminate the toxic remnants of poor past choices, making the contemplation of hiring a 66-year-old like Spalletti (noting his unsuccessful stint with the national team) a questionable decision.
It’s better to endure some challenges now, learn from past experiences, and foster a path toward a more promising future.