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Ryan O’Hanlon
A little over a year ago, Manchester United parted ways with Erik ten Hag, merely months after a comprehensive review concluded the club should retain him as head coach. The decision followed a loss to West Ham, 2-1.
“Sources informed ESPN that the decision to dismiss Ten Hag stemmed from a loss of faith in his ability to rejuvenate the team’s performance following a lackluster start to the new season,” wrote ESPN’s Rob Dawson at that time. “With just 11 points from nine league games, there are growing worries that United may fall too far behind to secure a place in next season’s Champions League.”
After finishing eighth the previous season and currently sitting in 14th place, the club appointed Ruben Amorim, culminating in a 15th-place finish for the previous season.
Under Ten Hag, they averaged 1.2 points per game, which dropped to 1.0 under Amorim. Their goal differential also declined from minus-0.3 to minus-0.4. Despite these worse-than-previous results, the club remained committed to their new manager.
Things appeared to be turning around as they embarked on a five-game unbeaten streak across all competitions during October and November. However, they suffered a setback with a 1-0 loss at home to Everton, who played with 10 men for over three-quarters of the match.
Currently, Manchester United ranks in a four-way tie for 10th place after 12 games. Marking a year since Amorim’s debut, they’ve completed a total of 13 league matches. Thus, we must ask: Are Manchester United truly better off than they were one year ago?
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What has changed at United under Ruben Amorim?
Tactical setups can be somewhat ambiguous; for example, one individual’s 4-3-3 can be perceived as another’s 4-2-3-1 or even 3-4-3. However, Amorim’s distinctive approach makes it challenging to separate his ideologies about the game from the numerical formations employed.
“I won’t alter my philosophy,” he stated during a tough phase for United back in September . “Should the United hierarchy desire a change, they should change the coach.”
According to Stats Perform, Amorim has utilized either a 3-4-3 or a 3-4-2-1 formation in all of his 39 matches at the club. Since the start of last season, only Crystal Palace manager Oliver Glasner has employed a back-three defense with greater frequency:
Although Amorim has maintained his formation and insists his philosophy is unchanging, this season has seen some shifts. Previously, Amorim’s United were notable for their slow and ineffective ball movement.
After Amorim’s arrival, United advanced the ball at an average rate of 0.98 meters per second, marking the second slowest pace in the league, trailing only Manchester City. Unlike City, however, United’s slowness stemmed from stagnating play in their own half rather than a cautious buildup in the opponent’s half.
In theory, a slow playing style can successfully dominate possession or alternatively, a quick tempo can yield results despite a lack of territorial dominance. When teams accomplish both, they typically enjoy considerable success, as seen with managers like Jurgen Klopp. Yet, if a team fails to achieve either criterion, victory becomes unlikely.
Not surprisingly, the previous season, teams that fell into the slow-and-not-dominant quadrant included two relegated sides, alongside West Ham and Wolves, both of whom are potential relegation candidates this season. Amorim’s United were equally close to finding themselves in this precarious situation.
This year tells a different story. The same chart, representing the first 12 matches of the current season:
While Amorim’s team continues to control a similar territory, their tempo has noticeably increased. This change has significantly enhanced their performance. Compared to their 27 matches under Amorim last season, they now average 0.5 more points per game, and their goal differential has improved by 0.4 per game. Over a complete season, that translates to approximately 19 additional points and a 15-goal differential enhancement.
How much better are they? And can this improvement be maintained?
To evaluate their progress, we’ll look at their adjusted goal differential, which combines 70% expected goals and 30% actual goals. Using this performance metric, they’ve flipped last season’s outlook — in a favorable manner. Last year, Amorim’s team had an adjusted goal differential of minus-0.16; this year, it’s risen to plus-0.20, good enough for seventh-best in the league.
From an attacking perspective, they now score an average of 1.67 adjusted goals per game, up from 1.29 under Amorim last season. Conversely, their adjusted goals conceded have seen a marginal increase, from 1.45 to 1.46.
This small trade-off has been worthwhile. By adopting a more aggressive ball approach, United has become slightly more defensively vulnerable but has dramatically improved their attacking output.
Striking the right balance between these approaches is quintessential to effective coaching, and Amorim has demonstrated progression from one season to the next. Young managers often benefit from similar opportunities to refine their skills as players do.
However, isolating Amorim’s coaching influence from the players’ performances poses a challenge. A key difference compared to last season is that all of United’s forwards have changed.
Bryan Mbeumo has participated in nearly every minute, while Matheus Cunha and Benjamin Sesko have each missed some time due to injuries but have started at least half of the matches. United’s attacking capabilities have improved this season, primarily due to the introduction of several new forwards.
But can Amorim take credit for this shift in playstyle?
The most discernible aspect of tactical changes involves goal kicks. This season, United has played two-thirds of their goal kicks long, compared to 45% last season.
Their goalkeepers have also adopted a more aggressive playstyle, launching the ball 60% of the time on non-goal kicks, nearly double last year’s rate of 32%. While part of this is attributable to André Onana’s absence, it aligns perfectly with the overall strategic shift. This appears to be a deliberate change.
But will this success be sustained?
United has benefited from various favorable scenarios this season.
For instance, they played with a one-man advantage early in the match against Chelsea. Despite Casemiro’s red card just before halftime, they had already secured a 2-0 lead and maintained the advantage against a team struggling with fatigue.
Against Everton, they faced another opportunity when Idrissa Gueye inadvertently clashed with a teammate, leaving United with an advantage for 80 minutes. Although they lost, this experience has allowed them to accumulate shot totals and expected goals figures they otherwise might have missed.
In addition, they have been awarded three penalties while not conceding any. Although penalties are not entirely arbitrary, United is currently on target to achieve nine or ten penalties this season, with none against them.
This is an improbable scenario, and if we exclude penalties from the adjusted metrics discussed earlier, their differential falls to plus-0.04 — a level nearly identical to the situation when Ten Hag was dismissed last season.
The pivotal question for United and their manager moving forward is: Will Amorim continue to improve? While the current situation is better than the end of last season, it primarily stems from the team’s performance under Amorim, which was noticeably worse than under Ten Hag.
With a steadfast coach like Amorim, one could argue that occasionally, a team may need to decline in order to eventually ascend. I discussed this in the context of his hiring: There may be early struggles while he implements his vision, but such challenges could yield longer-term benefits.
Nonetheless, based on the evidence, I remain hesitant to entirely commit my club to a manager who, despite demonstrating some potential for adaptation, still depends heavily on a specific type of player to execute his preferred system. It’s improbable that the next manager will also favor a formation requiring wingbacks and three center backs along with two interior midfielders instead of wingers.
The improvement isn’t significant enough — especially once we consider player changes versus coach-driven enhancements — to justify reconstructing the squad to fit Amorim’s ideal. This assessment is especially pertinent when one considers that a failed experiment would necessitate yet another squad overhaul.
Additionally, I am wary of the fact that much of the improvement has coincided with an older squad. Both midfielders, Casemiro and Bruno Fernandes, are in their 30s, illustrating an older average squad.
The club’s collective age has risen from 25.5 years last season to 26.5 this season, making the current United roster older than both Arsenal and Manchester City. They possess a win-now roster, yet are far from competing at that level.
Moreover, they began the season with a challenging schedule, not facing any of the presumed top four teams (Arsenal, City, Chelsea, and Liverpool) until mid-January. This timing might open the door for a hopeful run, potentially elevating performance even without the boosts from penalties and red cards.
In conclusion, Amorim deserves credit for steering United into a relatively stable zone. They are no longer in disarray, where every match feels precarious for staff and management. However, it is also evident that Manchester United has not convinced anyone they are capable of contending for the prestigious trophies they once frequently claimed.
Ultimately, Manchester United has settled into a position of mediocrity — not necessarily good or bad, but rather … average.