Has Pochs New Contract…

At least this time it didn’t require months of “advanced data analytics, sophisticated metrics, and cutting-edge hiring methods” to reach a conclusion.

Similar to the post-2022 World Cup scenario, the U.S. Soccer Federation opted to retain the coach who led the team to a disappointing round of 16 exit against a Benelux nation. Despite previous interest in AC Milan and aspirations for a future return to the Premier League, Mauricio Pochettino chose to stay. Earlier this week, U.S. Soccer announced a new deal that secures Pochettino’s position as USMNT head coach through the 2030 World Cup.

Thus, a new World Cup cycle unfolds for the USMNT with a permanent manager for the first time in 12 years. The previous cycle ended poorly, as Jurgen Klinsmann was dismissed during qualification and Bruce Arena failed to turn the situation around.

Things were also rocky when Gregg Berhalter was reinstated for a second cycle, leading to his departure after the 2024 Copa America, where the team exited in the group stage.

Pochettino brings a wealth of managerial experience that surpasses both Klinsmann and Arena. He has taken on the role under less than two years before the 2026 World Cup, during a cycle that does not include qualifying matches or a fully prepared Gold Cup team. This context lowers the likelihood of facing the common issue seen with the USMNT and various nations: clinging to a coach whose strategies have timed out.

Considering only the competitive matches, Pochettino has managed nine games with the USMNT. In leagues like the Premier League, past performance typically isn’t indicative of future results until a team has played about 10 games.

Nonetheless, Pochettino’s main challenge over the next cycle is clear: he must find a way to fulfill the task he was hired for—actually improving the team’s performance.

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Why the USMNT appeared better under Pochettino but didn’t actually improve

The simplest way to assess team performance across different eras is through Elo ratings. Teams earn or lose points based on their opponents’ quality, match score, game location, and match significance. Teams are ranked based on their cumulative points.

Currently, the top four in Elo are Spain, Argentina, England, and France. While these results do not always align—nor should they—the rankings reflect the top four teams from the recent World Cup.

As for the USMNT, they currently rank 31st, just below Algeria and just above Scotland. During the World Cup, they briefly climbed to 23rd after defeating Australia.

Here’s the progress made by the USMNT under each coach with at least 10 games since the 1994 World Cup:

Since Pochettino took charge in September 2024, the team has moved up six places and gained 21 rating points. Generally, a shift of around 20 points corresponds to a jump of three to six spots.

Interestingly, all of this rating increase occurred during the summer’s World Cup, even accounting for a 3-2 loss to Turkey that resulted in a 39-point deduction for the USMNT due to fielding a largely rotated squad. Thus, if we only focus on the World Cup, there is a valid argument that the team has improved under Pochettino’s guidance.

As previously noted, players do not perform like the USMNT did on their own. The team’s tactical rotations in midfield and with wingbacks, and their high-pressing style, originated from clear managerial vision and effective implementation strategies.

The U.S. scored 11 goals in the tournament, surpassing their previous record of seven in a World Cup. They achieved three wins—equaling the total they had across the 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018, and 2022 World Cups combined. Although the end result was another disappointing exit against a more talented opponent, the overall performance leading to that point was significantly better than in previous tournaments, reflecting a form of advancement.

However, the narrative becomes more complicated when looking beyond the World Cup’s opening match against Paraguay in Los Angeles. If we consider the additional four competitive matches featuring full-strength rosters, the USMNT lost 21 Elo points in the Nations League.

Including the mixed performances in the 2025 Gold Cup, that accounts for another seven lost points, mainly due to a shootout win (counted as a draw) against a weak Costa Rica team and a 2-1 final loss to Mexico. Additionally, when factoring in a string of friendlies—victories against Senegal, Uruguay, and Japan alongside losses against various European teams—results revert back to the previous state.

When Berhalter was dismissed following the Copa America loss to Uruguay, the USMNT was ranked 31st in the Elo standings, precisely where they remain today.

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How Can the USMNT Actually Improve Under Pochettino?

There are two primary avenues to address this question.

First: increase the number of competitive matches played. This should be feasible.

In addition to likely participating in the 2028 Copa America, the USMNT will also need to qualify for the 2030 World Cup. Given the current quality of teams in the confederation, Concacaf qualification is likely to be manageable, especially with the World Cup expanding to accommodate as many as 64 teams. Regardless, more meaningful games against any opposition will be beneficial.

Although I generally hesitate toward unverifiable analysis, the USMNT’s defeat to Belgium in the World Cup round of 16 appeared largely attributed to players succumbing to pressure. An away match against a team like Honduras presents a different challenge than competing against teams like Portugal or the Netherlands, yet both potentiate valuable stress-testing for the lineup and concepts.

Additionally, the effectiveness of friendly matches needs to be considered. After Pochettino’s continuous alterations in lineups and formations leading into the World Cup, the initial four matches during the tournament appeared to exhibit a cohesive plan, suggesting that seemingly erratic losses earlier on bore fruitful results. The presence of a coordinated system and player relationships only emerges from extensive training.

However, the narrative shifted dramatically following the departure against Belgium, raising questions about whether establishing a preferred starting eleven and style earlier could have mitigated collapse when facing more skilled opponents.

The truth lies somewhere in between: friendlies allow for experimentation in a sport where teams rarely engage in more than a handful of matches yearly. Conversely, any international soccer fixture is so limited that choices to experiment may cost valuable synergy time among the top players aligning in premier positions against superior talents.

Balancing these considerations is a challenge unique to Pochettino, who has primarily navigated club coaching, and is not typically a lesson taught.

This brings us to the second critical strategy: performing better against superior teams.

Throughout Pochettino’s tenure, the USMNT has faced 13 matches against opponents ranked within FIFA’s top 25 and 18 against teams outside of it, with records as follows:

Against top 25 teams: 3 wins, 1 draw, 9 losses, 17 goals scored, 29 goals conceded

Against teams outside the top 25: 14 wins, 1 draw, 3 losses, 40 goals scored, 16 goals conceded

As expected, the USMNT tends to perform better against weaker teams, but should the discrepancy truly be that vast?

This presents a tactical conundrum faced by every USMNT coach: when you’re the most skilled team in your confederation, how do you prepare for matches against more talented squads?

Pochettino’s high-press strategy is ideal when he leads a superior team, and while it can still yield results against more skilled opponents, it can leave the team vulnerable—evidenced by the tournament outcomes against teams like Belgium and others in friendlies from Europe.

Importantly, Pochettino has previously excelled in similar situations, establishing an effective high press that enabled Southampton and Tottenham to exceed their talent levels. However, as the game has evolved, more teams are now adept at countering such approaches.

The USMNT is undeniably stronger than Paraguay—as demonstrated by the score—but the latter’s tactical approach of playing conservatively allowed them to succeed against teams like Germany and nearly extending the match against France. Meanwhile, the U.S. suffered significant defeats against Belgium, a team less skilled than either of those rivals. While the aggressive strategy has a higher potential upside, it also carries greater risk.

Should the USMNT adopt a more defensive posture akin to Paraguay, they may find themselves with a closer outcome against Belgium but at the potential cost of not winning their group and facing ultimately tougher opponents in the knockout rounds. Additionally, a conservative playstyle may not engage fans as effectively as an aggressive one.

Finding a resolution to this challenge is undeniably complex, and Pochettino has been brought on with considerable financial backing given his reputation to tackle it.

What the team could most benefit from is a player adept at orchestrating play through accurate passing. This summer, the only player capable of controlling the game’s tempo was Tim Ream, who is 38 and unfit for the 2030 cycle.

While many players on the roster provide passing value in specific situations—around the penalty area or on the flanks—none of them can consistently deliver the level of control needed to dictate the game’s pace. A player capable of executing 90 passes, moving the ball forward when required while also slowing the tempo if things escalate, is vital for adapting to the various styles the USMNT will need to employ to progress in the coming years.

Pochettino will have to refresh the player pool, as the team’s average age weighted by minutes played this summer was 26.7. They were among the younger teams in the tournament, but maintaining the same roster by 2030 would place them among the oldest, with only two teams from this summer expected to be older. Even without Ream, they would still be significantly aged.

Perhaps Augsburg’s Noahkai Banks opts to represent the USMNT over Germany, develops into a standout player, and successfully replaces Ream while also enhancing the team’s quality. Alternatively, Adri Mehmeti, a promising 17-year-old midfielder for the New York Red Bulls, could quickly rise to meet his high potential. There is also a chance other young MLS stars follow suit.

It’s also possible that some of the current fringe midfielders—such as Middlesbrough’s Aidan Morris, Lyon’s Tanner Tessmann, Atletico Madrid’s Johnny Cardoso, or Milan’s Yunus Musah—emerge as the kind of controlling midfielder the team desperately needs. While these scenarios combine to paint a brighter picture, none of the individual outcomes seem particularly likely.

Ultimately, the 2026 World Cup was supposed to be a pivotal moment: a golden generation featuring Christian Pulisic and Weston McKennie in their prime, and playing at home, it was seen as the Americans’ best chance at a successful World Cup. Yet the ultimate result mirrored past outcomes.

Now, with the 2030 World Cup approaching, Pochettino’s task is to transition out some of the nation’s most skilled players while figuring out how to overcome stronger opponents with minimal competitive match exposure and ensuring that the team evolves as Pulisic and his contemporaries age out of their prime years. Good luck!